| Civil society preparations for the 7th BWC Review Conference 2011 | The Authors |
How will technological developments influence the BWC?Concluding SummaryThis discussion is finished. Click here to download the concluding summary. Kathryn Nixdorff - "Technological developments of relevance to the BWC: What are we talking about?" - 21 December 2010 ↓expand↓ Characteristic of the developments in science and technology over the past three decades is the enormous accumulation of knowledge concerning the molecular mechanisms and functions of biological systems. While this knowledge is essential for countering disease and promoting public health in general, it can at the same time be malignly misused for waging biological warfare. This paper will very briefly introduce several areas of advancement in the life sciences, focussing mainly on those that have advanced most significantly and appear to be most relevant for biosecurity and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC): genomics; synthetic biology; systems biology and proteomics; nanotechnology; and targeted delivery systems. These are all enabling technologies that are contributing most to the expanding threat spectrum. Genomics Genome analyses are concerned with the determination of the nucleotide base sequence of the genomic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of organisms. Functional genomics includes efforts to determine the functions of the genes identified through sequence analyses. Most relevant in the past few years are the advances in nucleic acid sequencing that lower the cost and time of sequencing tremendously. Illustrative of this is the third generation sequencing race to produce a human genome sequence for just $1000.1,2 One of the greatest concerns is the use of modern methods of genomics, molecular biology and information technology to manipulate and even create synthetic microorganisms. From the beginnings with the synthesis of the polio virus genome from “scratch”3, these studies have advanced to the recent claims that researchers from the J. Craig Venter Institute have created the first self-replicating bacterial cell comprised exclusively of synthetic DNA.4 What the researchers actually did was to synthesize and assemble a modified version of an intact bacterial genome of one species (Mycoplasma mycoides) and transfer this to a living bacterium of a different species (Mycoplasma capricolum). Of particular significance was that this synthetic genome was able to direct the bacterium to produce cells of the transferred genomic species (M. mycoides) type. While this accomplishment falls short of creating truly synthetic life it is nonetheless a milestone in the ability to genetically modify organisms on a scale never previously achieved. Synthetic Biology Synthetic biology, which began with engineering microorganisms with complex genetic circuits in order to make them perform totally new tasks5, has advanced now into four sub-fields: (1) engineering DNA-based biological circuits by using standardized biological parts, (2) identifying the smallest possible (minimal) genome that can “run” a cell, (3) constructing synthetic protocells, and (4) creating atypical biological systems through chemical processes.6 Synthetic biology has opened up extraordinary possibilities in biomedical and environmental engineering fields, but the scope for misuse is huge. Systems Biology and Proteomics The relative new area of systems biology looks at interacting physiological systems and seeks to understand how all the parts of the body operate as a whole, by integrating all levels of functional information into a cohesive model7 to aid, for example, in the elucidation of the complexity, structure and function of some physiological networks in different organisms. One example of using systems biology to elucidate physiological functions is the analysis of complex protein interactions in cells8. In this case there is a shift from focussing on single proteins and receptors to viewing the entire set of signal chains in an organism as the target. The target is defined by the net effect on an entire physiological system or even several interacting systems rather than by any separate target-receptor interaction. This type of proteome profiling has been actively applied in the search for new molecular targets for drugs9, an activity that has particular biosecurity relevance in the context of its potential in manipulating vital physiological functions such as those of the immune system or the nervous system. Nanotechnology Nanoparticles usually range in size between 1 nanometer (a billionth of a meter, or around 10 times the size of an atom) and 100 nanometers (the size of large molecules).10 Because of their small size, nanoparticles have the potential to penetrate into tissues more easily than larger particles, especially when they have been designed with particular physio-chemical properties to enhance their uptake over the nasal and respiratory routes or across the blood-brain barrier.11 This application of nanotechnology has particular relevance for delivery of biological agents in connection with drug therapy. One area of interest in the context of the prohibitions set out in article I of the BWC is the construction of synthetic, non-biological aptamers that exert effects on biological systems, such as the “plastic” antibodies designed to bind with and induce clearance of certain biochemical components from the bloodstream.12 It can, for example, be discussed whether such substances are covered by Article I of the Convention. Can they be considered biological agents? Targeted Delivery Systems At the bottom line, the possibilities of either use or misuse of biological agents depend on the ability to deliver the payload to the target in a way that it will be effective. A great deal of effort in developing targeted delivery systems has been made recently for use in vaccine therapy, cancer, drug and immunotherapy. At the same time, these systems could be misused to deliver biological warfare agents. There are several potential means of achieving targeted delivery, but two areas that have progressed most significantly and appear to be most relevant are advances in aerosol and viral vector delivery.13 Great strides are being made in aerosol delivery technology. Most significantly, the production of defined nanoparticles14 including new methods for enhancing absorption through the nasal and respiratory tracts and over the blood brain barrier15,16 create a potential for greatly improved aerosol delivery of bioactive compounds. In the case of viral vectors, the viruses are outfitted with foreign genes to act as ferries or vehicles that carry and deliver the foreign genes to the body. The strategy is that infection with the virus would lead to expression of the foreign gene in the cells of affected tissues, with the subsequent synthesis of the active substance (the gene product), which would then exert its calculated effect on those tissues. Substantial improvements in specific targeting, gene transfer and gene expression efficacy of viral vectors have been achieved over the past five years, and significant therapeutic benefit has been gained in several cases.17,18,19,20 Furthermore, some studies have indicated that administering a viral vector through inhalation is feasible.21,22,23 Questions for further consideration What actual relevance do the advances in science and technology have for the BWC? In what way might these advances extend the threat spectrum for the BWC? Which advances might be of most concern and which ones possibly of least concern? Do these advances have more relevance for the BWC or for biosecurity concerns outside of the BWC? References
↑collapse↑ Jonathan B. Tucker - "The security implications of synthetic biology" - 5 January 2011 ↓expand↓ What is really new about synthetic biology and what does it portend for the bioweapons threat? Genome synthesis differs from traditional genetic engineering in that it obviates the need to cut and splice existing genes and instead makes it possible to design and synthesize any conceivable genetic sequence from scratch. Over the longer term, synthetic biologists aim to combine functional genetic components called “BioBricks” in new ways to construct semi-synthetic microbes that can make useful products not available in nature, such as novel drugs and biofuels. The recent synthesis of a bacterial genome consisting of more than one million DNA units by a research team at the J. Craig Venter Institute does not pose any near-term security risks. For one thing, the project cost about $40 million and drew on cutting-edge science, putting such a capability beyond the reach of most states with offensive biowarfare programs, let alone terrorist groups. Similarly, the idea that military biologists could design and construct an artificial pathogen more deadly than those that exist in nature is improbable. To create such a microbe, it would be necessary to assemble complexes of genes that work in unison to infect the human host and suppress its immune defenses—capabilities that natural pathogens have acquired over eons of evolution. Given the huge technical hurdles involved, making a “super-bug” from scratch will remain science fiction. As the field of synthetic biology matures, however, it will entail real security risks that must be addressed in a proactive manner. The most immediate concern is the potential to recreate by chemical synthesis any known virus for which an accurate genetic sequence exists. State proliferators and sophisticated terrorist groups may seek to construct deadly “select agent” viruses in the laboratory in order to circumvent physical access controls. The incentive to do so may be particularly strong for virulent pathogens that no longer exist in nature, such as smallpox virus and the Spanish influenza virus. At present, piecing together DNA fragments into a functional genome requires considerable expertise and tacit knowledge, or hands-on experience that cannot easily be codified in written form. The weaponization and delivery of a synthetic virus would also pose major technical obstacles. Thus, for the near term, synthetic biology is unlikely to result in a significant increase in the bioterrorism threat. Nevertheless, two scenarios pose grounds for concern. The first involves an “insider”—a highly trained synthetic biologist who develops an obsessive grudge against certain individuals, entities, or society as a whole and decides to exploit his skills for destructive purposes. The second involves a “hacker”—an individual who does not necessarily have malicious intent but seeks to create synthetic microbes for fun or to demonstrate technical prowess, a common motivation for designers of computer viruses. As synthetic biology tools gradually become de-skilled in the form of kits and how-to manuals, making them accessible to students at the college level and below, a biohacker subculture could well emerge, increasing the risk of reckless or malevolent experimentation. Although the growing “do-it-yourself” biology movement appears to have benign intent, it has shown a troubling lack of biosafety awareness and training. A more positive recent development is that leading gene-synthesis companies have agreed voluntarily to minimize the risk of misuse by checking the bona fides of customers who order pieces of synthetic DNA over the Internet, and by screening synthesis orders for DNA sequences associated with pathogenicity. Advocates of “open-source biology” are naïve in thinking that transparency alone will prevent accidents and deliberate misuse. Growing awareness of this fact has led to calls for the formal regulation of synthetic biology. Professor George Church of Harvard Medical School, a leader in the field, has recommended a minimum training requirement, along with registration and perhaps certification, before individuals are allowed to assemble synthetic genetic parts into self-replicating organisms. The bottom line is that synthetic biology is not a parlor game but a serious business with potential safety and security risks for society at large. To the extent possible, access to this powerful technology should be limited to individuals who know what they are doing, take proper precautions, and demonstrate responsible conduct. Maria J. Espona - "The heterogeneous distribution of technologies around the globe" - 12 January 2011 ↓expand↓ The accumulation of knowledge in the life sciences is fostered by the advances in other scientific and technological areas, such as engineering and informatics, creating a highly complex web of disciplines which interact in almost unthinkable ways. The dissemination of knowledge about basic life sciences and new technological developments has almost no limits, besides the fee you might need to pay to access a certain article or university course (plus a security screening because of your origin). But in terms of equipment and technologies needed to work in cutting edge life science, the situation is completely different. There are huge differences in technology replacement rates between developed and developing countries. The picture below shows the distribution of new technologies; H stands for high tech (less than 5 years old), M for medium tech (more than 5 but less than 10 years old), and L for low tech (more than 10 years old); the size of the rectangles indicates the prevalence of the respective type of technologies.  Clearly, the availability of technologies influences what activities in the life sciences can be carried out. The lack of high technologies, however, does not automatically mean that certain activities are impossible; they might still be possible but require more time and human resources (think DNA sequencing, for example). In other words, the hostile use of the life sciences is, unfortunately, possible not only through high tech, but also through middle and low tech means. Keeping this in mind is important if we think about technologies of particular relevance for the BWC. In summary, to keep pace with the technologies relevant to the BWC we should consider not only the rapid evolution of existing and the emergence of new technologies, but also the heterogeneous distribution of technologies around the globe and the specific national contexts of their development. This is not an easy job, especially when it is not possible to see where science and technology are going. Or did someone think in the 1960s that creating a microorganism from scratch would be possible? Ineke Malsch - "Nanotechnology and the BTWC" - 18 January 2011 ↓expand↓ In her contribution of 21 December, Kathryn Nixdorf highlighted some developments in nanotechnology and drug delivery with potential implications for the Biological Weapons Convention. The question whether plastic antibodies would be covered by the BTWC convention seems to be more a legal issue than a technical one. On a similar note, Jürgen Altmann warned recently that in the future, ‘nano-agents’ could be developed which could destroy organic cells by physical mechanisms rather than biological or chemical. It appears that States Parties would interpret the BTWC convention broadly enough to cover scientific and technological progress. But it would do no harm raising this issue.1 Nanotechnology development is not necessarily bad news for the BTWC. In his assessment of military nanotechnology, Altmann included not only potential hostile applications of nanotechnology in biological and chemical weapons, but also opportunities for detecting and protecting against hostile agents offered by progress in nanosensors and other nanotechnologies.2 From my perspective, it is important to discuss the relation between nanotechnology and the BTWC on a more strategic level. Nanotechnology is still a container term encompassing interdisciplinary research on many different types of materials and devices, where the nanometer scale is the common denominator. This means in practice that research labeled biotechnology in the past may currently be called nano(bio)technology. It is important to stress that the precautionary approach to dual use biotechnology should also cover relevant research labeled nanotechnology. Another related concern is that nanoresearchers with a physical, chemical or other non-biological educational background participating in nanobiotechnology projects could end up handling dual use biological materials without proper training in biosafety and biosecurity measures. Universities and other research organizations should have proper protocols in place to prevent accidents. In the Dutch project Nanorecht en Vrede (Nanorights and Peace)3, we organized a discussion on nanotechnology and security including dual use aspects. Among the outcomes of this discussion was that there is a lack of awareness of the biosecurity risks and current regulations in the laboratory. On the other hand, the government is putting increasing pressure on the academic community to contribute to their national security policy, for instance by excluding researchers and students from some countries from studies with a dual use character. This securitization trend was considered an unjustified limitation to academic freedom. The result could be an improved sense of security among policy makers and the general public without improving actual security. At the same time, such a restrictive policy is likely to inhibit scientific and technological progress that would have contributed to healthcare and other societal benefits. To conclude: (nano)technology and the BTWC mutually influence each other and merit a nuanced discussion. References
Kathryn Nixdorff - "The expanding nature of the threat spectrum" - 31 January 2011 ↓expand↓ Aside from the question as to how actual a threat some biotechnologies pose for the BWC, there is no doubt that the threat spectrum is expanding exponentially as a result of advances in biotechnology in the past decade. This is illustrated most graphically in a report provided by three US defence analysts1, which considered the evolution of biological warfare agents in three phases. The first and second phases consisted of (1) traditional biological agents such as pathogenic microorganisms and toxins followed by (2) genetically modified traditional biological agents. These authors contend that the threat posed by these agents has been increasing steadily since the early 20th century for traditional agents, and since the early 1970s for genetically modified agents. However, they propose that these increasing threats will eventually level off as a result of the development of defence countermeasures such as vaccines and antimicrobial drugs that will be able to deal with the threats, since there are only a limited number of traditional agents and only a limited number of ways to genetically modify traditional agents. While one might be inclined to take issue with this conclusion, there is certainly no denial that we are presently witnessing the third phase of threat evolution described by these authors (3), an exponentially increasing, unlimited array of what has been termed advanced biological warfare (ABW) agents as a result of knowledge gained through life sciences work in the emerging fields of functional genomics, synthetic biology, systems biology and nanotechnology. This work is without question essential in fighting disease more effectively and in promoting health in general. At the same time, an ever increasing number of targets will be identified, against which advanced biological warfare agents may be designed in a systems approach to creating novel biochemical weapons that would be able to attack vitally important bodily functions such as respiration, blood pressure, heart rate, body temperature, mood and consciousness, as well as innate and adaptive immune responses. Petro et al. noted that this “capability-based threat posed by ABW agents will continue to expand indefinitely in parallel with advances in biotechnology.” Given that the production of vaccines and therapeutics needed to protect against all traditional agents is itself so uncertain and indeed has a high failure rate2, it is illusory to believe that protective countermeasures of this sort could ever be achieved for the endless array of potential agents that will result from continuing advances in the life sciences. It is all the more essential that the use of such agents for malign purposes be prevented. In his contribution entitled “The security implications of synthetic biology” Jonathan Tucker stated quite correctly that there are huge technical hurdles involved in fabricating and delivering a functional synthetic virus. Indeed, it could be said that the application of any of the more sophisticated advances in the emerging biotechnology fields with the aim of producing a novel, more effective biological weapon is much more difficult than is often suggested. Frequent assertions that biological weapons production is easy grossly underestimate the difficulties and time-consuming nature of biotechnology in practice.3 At the same time, Jonathan Tucker points out that even quite demanding manipulations are continually being simplified, which could increase the risk of “reckless or malevolent experimentation”. While it is difficult to say just how actual the threat from advances in biotechnology is at present or will be in the future, the fact that the threat spectrum is expanding at an exponential rate would tend to increase this risk even more. References
Jonathan B. Tucker - "The convergence of biology and chemistry " - 3 February 2011 ↓expand↓ Biological and chemical production methods, once distinct, are converging—a development with important implications for the BWC. For example, the invention of advanced DNA synthesizers has made it possible to construct genes and even entire microbial genomes by strictly chemical means. Over the past decade, scientists have used gene synthesis to recreate several pathogenic viruses from scratch, including poliovirus and the formerly extinct “Spanish” strain of influenza, which caused a global pandemic in 1918-1919. Chemical methods are also being used to produce a wide variety of peptides, short protein chains consisting of 20 possible amino-acid units. Worldwide, pharmaceutical companies are marketing some 40 peptide-based drugs, including the anti-HIV therapeutic Fuzeon and the potent painkiller Prialt. Peptide synthesis has also become a thriving commercial business involving some 80 companies worldwide. These firms produce peptides to order according to customer specifications and in quantities ranging from a few milligrams for research use to thousands of kilograms for the pharmaceutical industry. The human body produces many biologically active peptides called “bioregulators” that control temperature, blood pressure, sleep, immunity, and other vital physiological functions. Although at low concentrations bioregulators are essential for life, they can be toxic at higher levels or if their molecular structure is changed, raising concern over their potential development as lethal or incapacitating agents. For example, a bioactive peptide called Substance P, consisting of a chain of 11 amino acids, serves as a messenger chemical in the central and peripheral nervous systems. In 1999 scientists at the Swedish Defense Research Establishment administered Substance P to guinea pigs the form of an aerosol, an airborne suspension of microscopic particles that can be absorbed in the deep region of the lungs. Under these conditions, Substance P was acutely toxic, with a lethal dose of only 368 micrograms (millionths of a gram) per cubic meter of air. This finding led the Swedish researchers to warn that the peptide was “a possible future warfare agent.”1 Although natural peptides are unstable in aerosol form and are rapidly broken down by enzymes in the body, structural variants of these molecules might be developed that resist degradation and can enter the brain from the bloodstream. In addition, engineered nanoparticles might be used to facilitate the delivery of bioactive peptides in aerosol form or to target specific body tissues. In 1925 the League of Nations (the forerunner to the United Nations) negotiated the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of toxic chemicals and bacteriological agents but does not restrict their production and stockpiling. Seeking to extend this ban to cover development and production, the UN disarmament conference in Geneva agreed in 1971 to negotiate separate treaties banning biological and chemical weapons. The rationale was that whereas biological agents had been used only rarely in warfare and were assessed to have little military utility, chemical agents had been employed extensively in World War I and other conflicts. The result of this strategy was the 1972 BWC and, two decades later, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Today, however, the convergence of biological and chemical production methods is creating gaps in the disarmament regime. Although the BWC prohibits the chemical synthesis of viruses for hostile purposes, it does not include any formal mechanisms to verify compliance. Conversely, the CWC has extensive verification measures but does not ban the chemical synthesis of viruses because they do not cause harm through “toxic effects on living systems.” As a result, there is currently no verification in this area. The chemical synthesis of peptides is another emerging gap in the treaty regime. Given that both the BWC and the CWC ban the acquisition for hostile purposes of natural toxins and bioregulators, one would expect that the controls in this area would be particularly strong. In practice, however, the CWC verification regime does not cover the chemical synthesis of bioactive peptides because such compounds are not listed in the treaty’s Schedules of Chemicals, which determine which production facilities must be declared and opened for routine inspection. Convergence is rendering obsolete the traditional strategy of pursuing biological and chemical arms control on separate tracks. Because the BWC and the CWC have different provisions and sets of states parties, it is impossible to merge them, but the future implementation of the treaties will have to be better coordinated. As a first step, the CWC-implementing body, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, should establish a liaison position for a representative from the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in Geneva. Although the ISU currently has only three full-time staff members, the upcoming five-year review conference of the BWC in December 2011 is expected to expand the size of the unit, in which case it would be possible to send an ISU representative to the OPCW. In sum, technological convergence is creating gaps in the CWC and the BWC that could undermine efforts to prevent the misuse of DNA and peptide synthesis for hostile purposes. Although this risk has not yet materialized, the rapid pace of technological progress and the political hurdles facing efforts to strengthen the two treaties suggest that it is not too soon to address the problem. References
Maria J. Espona - "Technology dissemination: an analysis of it dynamic" - 15 February 2011 ↓expand↓ Jonathan Tucker and Ineke Malsch mentioned in their contributions the two sides of science and technology dissemination dynamic: the tangible and intangible ones. The tangible, related to goods and microorganisms transfer, is the easier to control. But to do that it is important to identify what to control and how to better do it. Not an easy task… even when we manage to identify the relevant dual use technology, we still need to find out which goods are included on the them, taking into account the different development degrees in different countries and non state organizations. The Australia Group is working on this since its origin, not always successfully. The other side is the non tangible one, quite a challenge in the struggle against biological proliferation. The continuous growing of biological sciences together with the mass media revolution creates a new dimension on the scientific universe. We can now talk with our colleagues in real time about whatever we want to without being detected. So until which point travel restrictions applied to professionals are the best way to control knowledge exchange? What about students’ application restrictions? Some countries rely on such immigration for the science and technology evolution, so the restrictions could affect their progress. Where those students go instead of developed countries? To universities in developing countries with less control on qualified migration or different human rights considerations. So we don’t solve the problem, we just translate it to a different area. If we put together both aspects and consider what happen in developed and developing countries:  What we see here is that even when we can apply some sort of technology control to countries suspected of biological proliferation (included in developing ones), the people who will work with them is prepared to do so, and their will have good results even with 10 years old equipment. In biological proliferation fight we have several actors involved, but not all of them participate actively in this process. At the beginning just state actors participate and in the last years we witnessed the growing participation of NGO’s and life scientists’ professionals. In order to understand all aspects of technology transfer we need the participation of all members of relevant communities, including the military and commercial biotechnology ones. Ineke Malsch - "The nature of biological risks" - 22 February 2011 ↓expand↓ Kathryn Nixdorf discussed a scenario where the threat posed by biotechnology would increase exponentially. I am not so convinced that this is in fact a realistic scenario. In classical risk assessment, risk = hazard x exposure. So even if a virus, bacterium or other biological agent is very hazardous for humans or other species, this does not matter if nobody is exposed to it. One important question to ask is: who would want and be able to use biotechnology to create and use radically new pathogens that could expose humans or other species and cause pandemics? There are not enough resources to protect the world against any conceivable risk, but there are ways to find out whether a possible risk is indeed imminent. States Parties to the BTWC convention are responsible for enforcing the rules stipulated in the convention and for protecting the security of their citizens in general. National intelligence services have the task to identify states or non-state actors preparing for such illegal activities. Citizens including the scientific community and companies will have to help the state carry out its duty to protect the security of all citizens. These and other technical and non-technical instruments are needed to limit exposure to new biohazards as much as possible. In addition, a biohazard is not the same as the exponentially increasing theoretical threat spectrum discussed by Nixdorf. Whether a new virus, bacterium or other biological agent constitutes a hazard is not just dependent on the agent itself but also on how it interacts with the human body or other organisms. In the natural environment, many organisms are dangerous for other organisms, but pose no threat to humans in any way. Furthermore, pathogens that used to threaten human life in the past have currently been brought under control by the human invention of vaccines, antibiotics, antiviral drugs etc. In addition, hygiene and access to clean water and healthy food has helped a great deal to protect people in industrialized countries against pandemics. However, nature itself may be more innovative than homo sapiens. Think about the regular emergence of new diseases such as SARS and H1N1 influenza. Therefore any adaptation of the BTWC convention should not just take into account new expected exponential increases of the bio-threat spectrum. A balanced approach is needed that also fosters life sciences and other activities beneficial to the lives of humans and other species. Kathryn Nixdorff - "How can the states parties to the BWC approach the review of advances in science and technology relevant to the BWC that would improve the process?" - 3 March 2011 ↓expand↓ Some discussants have already begun to offer suggestions with regard to the aim of the project: “…to clarify, from a civil society point of view, how the issue under discussion should be approached at the Review Conference”. I would like to offer a suggestion for one approach to dealing with concerns about the effectiveness of the review of advances in science and technology of relevance to the BWC. First of all let me reply briefly to some of the points raised by Ineke Malsch in the previous round about the Petro et al. scenario1 I discussed in my contribution, in order to clarify some questions before I go on. I can appreciate that she questions the scenario. I said myself that one might want to take issue with at least the first two phases of it. Petro et al. do indeed regard the third phase, an exponentially increasing, unlimited array of biological agents that could be misused, as an increase in the threat. Ineke Malsch is right to take issue with this. I myself do not see this as an increase in the threat, but rather an increase in the threat “spectrum”, that is, the scope of potential biological agents that could be misused. In the original contribution that I submitted the word “spectrum” was italisized to emphasize this. However, I admit I did not make this clear in the further discussion. I also agree with Ineke Malsch that a biohazard is not the same as this threat spectrum. I just tried to argue that the increase in the spectrum could contribute to the risk of misuse. The greatest danger of misuse of sophisticated advances in science and technology that we have been considering is most likely to come from state-supported actors rather than sub-state actors and individuals, as state-supported actors would have more means to put sophisticated advances into practice. This has been very convincingly illustrated by the description of the numerous contingencies and socio-technical factors that made the chemical synthesis of the polio virus much more difficult2 than is often suggested. This places particular responsibility on the States Parties to the BWC to deal with the potential of misuse at the level of possible state-supported programmes. While Article I of the Convention prohibits the malign use of this knowledge for waging biological warfare, the security assurance that this should provide is a great deal less than desired because of the lack of adequate means of demonstrating international compliance with the Convention. To date, all new developments in science and technology of relevance that have been dealt with in the BWC Review Conference process have been found to be covered by the all-encompassing formulation of prohibitions provided by the general purpose criterion in Article I of the Convention. However, this provides little assurance that offensive programmes are not being developed. The concern about this lack of security assurance becomes even greater in light of the exponentially expanding threat spectrum of potential biological warfare agents that could induce reassessment of the utility of such agents. At the beginning of this decade, a UK Green Paper stressed that the “…accelerating pace of scientific developments now makes it quite unsafe only to have five-yearly technology reviews by the States Parties to support the five-yearly Review Conferences…”3 and went on to suggest that a review by an open-ended body of government and non-government scientists be made every one or two years. The time to pick up on this suggestion is way overdue. Just how often this review should be made is open to debate, but to wait every five years is just too long given the rapidity and above all the complexity of science and technology developments. This more frequent review is necessary in order to properly assess what needs to be done to increase security assurance. Crucial, however, is the type of scrutiny that needs to be applied. Up to now the reviews of advances in science and technology have been carried out mainly by individual States Parties or the ISU and submitted as background papers. However, there has never really been the necessary intensive, collective scrutiny of these assessments by the negotiating body as a whole. To receive the collective attention of the States Parties that would be most useful, a body of policy makers and scientists representative of all States Parties as well as experts from civil society could meet for an intensive exchange of views. This direct exchange to really hash out the concerns would be most productive for understanding these concerns from the perspective of both policy makers and scientists. A proposal for consideration of what needs to be done for greater security assurance that would take views from both sides into account could then be worked out and presented for consideration of the BWC body as a whole. References
Jonathan B. Tucker - "How biotechnology can strengthen the BWC" - 16 March 2011 ↓expand↓ Previous contributions to this roundtable have noted that certain biotechnologies (such as whole-genome synthesis) might be misused to develop novel biological warfare agents that are resistant to standard medical countermeasures, posing new challenges to the BWC. To conclude this discussion on a more positive note, emerging biotechnologies could also strengthen the Convention by facilitating the development of medical countermeasures against current and future threat agents, and by helping to identify the perpetrator of a biological attack. Because microbial pathogens have delayed effects, they could be delivered anonymously to evade attribution and retaliation, a characteristic that might make biological weapons attractive to outlaw states and terrorist groups. In an effort to counter this threat, the emerging field of microbial forensics employs advanced genetic and physiochemical analyses to identify the source of the agent used in a biological attack. For example, scientists investigating the 2001 anthrax letter attacks in the United States were able to trace the deadly spores back to a single flask at the U.S. Army’s biodefense laboratory at Fort Detrick in Maryland, narrowing the range of potential suspects. By helping to bring bioterrorists to justice or target them for military retaliation, microbial forensics and attribution can create disincentives to the acquisition and use of biological weapons. Recent advances in microbial forensics could bolster the BWC in at two additional ways. First, these technologies could support United Nations field investigations of alleged biological weapons use. During the 1980s, the UN General Assembly adopted a series of resolutions under which any member state can request the Secretary-General to investigate a suspected incident of biological or chemical warfare by dispatching an international team of experts to the attack site. Between 1980 and 1992, the Secretary-General launched about a dozen such missions, all involving the alleged use of chemical or toxin weapons. Several of these investigations included the analysis of environmental or biomedical samples, yielding hard scientific evidence for or against the allegation of use. Although the last field investigation under the Secretary-General’s mechanism took place in 1992, nearly two decades ago, the mechanism remains in effect and can draw on 200 experts and 20 reference laboratories nominated by 41 member states. The UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA) is responsible for maintaining the rosters of experts and laboratories, conducting training exercises, and providing logistical support to investigation teams in the field. At present, however, ODA lacks the scientific and financial resources to make effective use of advanced analytical techniques by validating assays and testing the proficiency of reference laboratories. Thus, if microbial forensics is to play a useful supporting role in future UN investigations of alleged bioweapons use, ODA will require assistance from the United States and other countries. Another potential application of microbial forensics is to help monitor compliance with the BWC, which lacks formal verification measures. In September 1991, the Third BWC Review Conference established an ad hoc group of governmental experts known as “VEREX” to identify and examine possible verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. The VEREX final report, released in September 1993, concluded that analyzing samples collected at biological production facilities “could provide key information to resolve certain ambiguities about compliance because of the possibility of identifying the nature of an agent . . . [and] of obtaining an independent confirmation of analytical results in the event that findings are disputed.” Unfortunately, the subsequent effort to negotiate a legally binding BWC verification protocol, containing provisions for sampling and analysis, collapsed in 2001. Over the past 18 years since the VEREX report, technologies relevant to microbial forensics, such as whole-genome sequencing and bioinformatics, have made dramatic advances. To be suitable for monitoring BWC compliance, such techniques must provide a high level of sensitivity and specificity to minimize the risk of false-positives and false-negatives. Another requirement is that the methodology for sampling and analysis must safeguard confidential proprietary information. During the BWC protocol negotiations, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries opposed on-site inspections because of concerns that international inspectors might surreptitiously remove genetically-engineered production microorganisms in use at a plant and analyze them to steal valuable trade secrets. In sum, to be acceptable for BWC monitoring purposes, microbial-forensic techniques must have a high degree of accuracy and consistency, and they must also be precisely targeted to identify virulence factors and toxins of bioweapons concern while protecting unrelated proprietary information. If these technical and political requirements can be met, microbial forensics could eventually provide a powerful new tool for monitoring compliance with the BWC. Maria J. Espona - "Technology flow, a sistemic análisis" - 23 March 2011 ↓expand↓ It is clear to all of us that the civil society can make an important contribution to the BWC Review Conferences, especially when it comes to the impact of science and technology progress on the BWC. Kathryn Nixdorff mentioned in her contribution: “To receive the collective attention of the States Parties that would be most useful, a body of policy makers and scientists representative of all States Parties as well as experts from civil society could meet for an intensive exchange of views”, I will add to that group representatives from the industries which work with this new cutting edge technologies. Mario Bunge (1) has an interesting way to show the interaction between sectors in science and technology: 
Each development has a diagram like this one, so in a modern technology development we have a big number of areas feeding each development. Here one of the big challenges, how to identify all the technologies involved in a given development? Is it a possible task? During this round table we discussed about which technologies will have an impact on the BWC, but I think we will need to consider also other technologies related to them, an also monitor their progress. If we analyze the new technologies, such as proteomics, nanotechnology or synthetic biology, we found out that they are not a pure technology; they are the result of the interaction of several areas, and probably they are also relevant to the BWC. As a recommendation, it is important to work together all the members of the society which work in areas related to the BWC: government, military, commercial and academics. But also we need to work hard on the identification of the relevant areas from where the professionals will come. A systemic approach to an evolving issue. References
Ineke Malsch - "Towards biosecurity enhancing life sciences" - 30 March 2011 ↓expand↓ In my last contribution I would like to support the proposals made by Kathryn Nixdorf, Jonathan Tucker and Maria Espinosa for strengthening the BTWC convention. In addition, I would like to point the other way. It is not only important that scientists, civil society and industry participate in continuous monitoring of technological progress to enable timely adaptation of the convention. In addition, the guidance of the scientific and technological practices and developments through current rules imposed by the convention should be strengthened. In the area of information and communication technologies giving rise to privacy and security issues, there is much discussion on privacy enhancing design and security enhancing design. Why not apply a similar concept to life sciences? The same multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholder community that should be involved in monitoring scientific and technological progress could come together to agree on best practices for doing research and for designing living organisms in such a way that they present minimal biohazard. I understand that it will be a difficult task because science is inherently unpredictable and the accidental invention of new deadly organisms can not be excluded totally. However, the spirit of the BTWC convention is not to promise a risk-free world, but to make the scope for misuse of life sciences for biological weapons as narrow as possible. How could biosecurity enhancing life sciences be implemented? This should encompass a range of organizational, infrastructural and technological elements. The existing legislation and codes of conduct for biosecurity can be considered the current best practices for the organization of life sciences. There is a need for ongoing discussion, and wider dissemination and awareness raising, about these regulations and codes. Infrastructure for life sciences includes laboratories and equipment. A grand challenge could be to design equipment in such a way that materials that are biohazardous for humans can not be produced with them or that any hazardous materials produced will automatically be detected and destroyed. In future visions of ‘designer chemistry’, the structure and properties of new molecules is expected to be predicted in advance by computer models.1 Will it be possible to programme the computers in such a way that any resulting structure that is hazardous to humans will automatically be deleted before anyone sees it? To return to the original question of what should be done to strengthen the BTWC convention, I suggest to the States Parties to consider funding projects to develop the concept of “biosecurity enhancing design” further. The proposed permanent monitoring body for relevant progress in science and technology could also be mandated to monitor best practices in the biosecure organization, infrastructure and technology in the life sciences. References
Kathryn Nixdorff - "How should the issue of scientific and technological developments be approached at the Seventh Review Conference of the BWC?" - 30 March 2011 ↓expand↓ In my last contribution I would like to support the proposals made by Kathryn Nixdorf, Jonathan Tucker and Maria Espinosa for strengthening the BTWC convention. In addition, I would like to point the other way. It is not only important that scientists, civil society and industry participate in continuous monitoring of technological progress to enable timely adaptation of the convention. In addition, the guidance of the scientific and technological practices and developments through current rules imposed by the convention should be strengthened. In the area of information and communication technologies giving rise to privacy and security issues, there is much discussion on privacy enhancing design and security enhancing design. Why not apply a similar concept to life sciences? The same multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholder community that should be involved in monitoring scientific and technological progress could come together to agree on best practices for doing research and for designing living organisms in such a way that they present minimal biohazard. I understand that it will be a difficult task because science is inherently unpredictable and the accidental invention of new deadly organisms can not be excluded totally. However, the spirit of the BTWC convention is not to promise a risk-free world, but to make the scope for misuse of life sciences for biological weapons as narrow as possible. How could biosecurity enhancing life sciences be implemented? This should encompass a range of organizational, infrastructural and technological elements. The existing legislation and codes of conduct for biosecurity can be considered the current best practices for the organization of life sciences. There is a need for ongoing discussion, and wider dissemination and awareness raising, about these regulations and codes. Infrastructure for life sciences includes laboratories and equipment. A grand challenge could be to design equipment in such a way that materials that are biohazardous for humans can not be produced with them or that any hazardous materials produced will automatically be detected and destroyed. In future visions of ‘designer chemistry’, the structure and properties of new molecules is expected to be predicted in advance by computer models.1 Will it be possible to programme the computers in such a way that any resulting structure that is hazardous to humans will automatically be deleted before anyone sees it? To return to the original question of what should be done to strengthen the BTWC convention, I suggest to the States Parties to consider funding projects to develop the concept of “biosecurity enhancing design” further. The proposed permanent monitoring body for relevant progress in science and technology could also be mandated to monitor best practices in the biosecure organization, infrastructure and technology in the life sciences. References
Comments on this discussion are welcome at nixdorff[at]bio.tu-darmstadt.de. |
Kathryn Nixdorff is a retired professor in the Department of Microbiology and Genetics at Darmstadt University of Technology, Germany. Her research involved the molecular aspects of the interaction of microorganisms with cells of the immune system, in particular the regulation of proinflammatory cytokine production in macrophages. She is a founding member of the interdisciplinary research group concerned with science, technology and security (IANUS) at Darmstadt University of Technology, working in this group on problems involving the relevance of advances in the life sciences for the control of biological weapons. She serves on the Board of Directors of the BioWeapons Prevention Project as a representative of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES). Maria J. Espona Maria J. Espona, biologist, currently doing her PhD in International Relations, is an expert in the weapons of mass destruction field, especially in the biological weapons arena. She is a Professor and teaches in postgraduate courses science and technology and disarmament (National Defense School and University of Buenos Aries), information quality and digital intelligence and science and technology intelligence (National University of La Plata), and also in other academic units both in the private and public sector. In 2009, along with Eduardo Gauna and MITIQ support, she started the Information Quality Program in Argentina (ArgIQ). She received in 2010 the Leadership Award from the MIT IQ Program. Ineke Malsch Ineke Malsch is a physics graduate (University of Utrecht, 1991) and currently the director of Malsch TechnoValuation, a consultancy on technology and society. Find further information on projects and publications at www.malsch.demon.nl. Ineke has been engaged in Pax Christi International's work on the BWC for about ten years as a volunteer and was involved in the Dutch KNAW project developing a code of conduct for biosecurity as member of the advisory committee. Currently, she is a member of the valorisation panel for a project on biosecurity and dual use research at 3TU.Ethics in the Netherlands. Jonathan B. Tucker Jonathan B. Tucker is Georg Zundel Professor of Science and Technology for Peace and Security at Darmstadt University of Technology near Frankfurt, Germany. Previously he was a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, DC. In 2008 he served on the professional staff of the U.S. Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. |